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1.  INTRODUCTION
The now conventional view of R&D spillovers in the 1990s is that they
are pervasive, quantitatively important and a justification for industrial
policy.  But these views were also held by Marshall in the 1890s and
they were made explicit by Pigou in his 1912 Economics of Welfare.
In this paper we ask:  what have we learned in the intervening hundred
years?  More specifically, what additional arguments for industrial
policy are provided by R&D spillovers in the light of recent work in the
theory of international trade policy? 
Most recent discussions of R&D spillovers in open economies,
such as the work on endogenous growth by Grossman and Helpman
(1991), have assumed they occur in industries characterised by
monopolistic competition.  The combination of free entry (so long-run
profits are competed away) and no strategic interdependence between
firms leads to models which, while complicated in other respects, have
very simple implications for policy.  R&D spillovers towards other
domestic firms generate an externality which should be subsidised.  In
this paper we explore a different approach to R&D subsidies, which
combines them with the other half of the ‘new’ trade theory, the theory
of strategic trade policy.  We show that even simple oligopoly models,
where profits persist and firms behave strategically, have surprising
implications for optimal policy in the presence of R&D spillovers.
Most previous work on R&D spillovers and strategic behaviour
has focused on intra-industry spillovers in a closed economy.1  This
issue was addressed by Spence (1984) who showed that spillovers tend
to weaken the strategic incentive to invest in R&D.  d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) demonstrated in a linear duopoly model that R&D
cooperation can internalise this externality.  Their work was extended
and generalised by Suzumura (1992) who considered many firms and
general demands, and by Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) and Ziss
2(1994) who also considered price competition.  Leahy and Neary
(1997b) synthesise this literature, disentangling the effects of
cooperation from those of strategic behaviour, and apply the model to
examine optimal industrial policy in a closed economy.
R&D spillovers in an open economy raise additional issues which
are inherently more complex.  This is because the assumption of
symmetry between firms which is normally made in closed economy
models cannot be maintained.  In the first place, a nationalistic
government cares only about the profits of home firms.  In the second
place, the nature of spillovers is more complicated.  They may be either
local or international2, and either inter- or intra-industry.  Intuitively
we might expect that local spillovers justify subsidising R&D, and
international spillovers justify taxing them.  For example, Spencer
(1986) argues that a domestic industry will be a better candidate for
R&D subsidies the lower the spillovers are of new technology to
foreign firms.  However, we shall see that strategic behaviour by firms
may reverse these expected results.
The other issue raised by R&D spillovers is whether they can be
internalised by cooperation between firms, thus rendering industrial
policy redundant.  Once again, it turns out that this presumption is
overturned if firms behave strategically.
  The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 sets up the
model, which builds on Spencer and Brander (1983) and Leahy and
Neary (1996).  Like these papers we examine trade and industrial
policy in a two-period duopoly model in which firms choose R&D and
output.  However, these earlier papers did not discuss R&D spillovers.
In Section 3 we explore how strategic behaviour and R&D cooperation
affect optimal industrial policy in a model when spillovers are local
and inter-industry.  In Section 4 we explore strategic effects in the
presence of international spillovers.  In Section 5 we examine the linear
case in order to obtain more definite results.  Finally, Section 6
concludes with a summary of results.
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2. THE MODEL
Consider a model in which there are two oligopolistic industries.3  In
each industry a different domestic firm and a foreign firm export a
homogeneous commodity to a third market.  The third-country demand
function facing industry i is:
where qi represents home exports and q*i  represents foreign exports in
sector i.  (An asterisk will often be used to represent a foreign variable.)
We also define ri=(qi+q*i )biN/b i, the elasticity of the slope of the
industry i demand function.  This will prove useful later.  In this model
we distinguish two time periods.  Period 1 is the pre-market R&D phase
and period 2 is the output phase. 
The home and foreign firms in each industry choose R&D levels
xi and x*i  respectively for period 1 and outputs for period 2.  This
accords with a natural temporal sequence in which R&D is carried out
before production takes place.  Marginal production costs are constant
in output but are declining in the firms’ own R&D expenditure and
(through spillover effects) in the R&D expenditures of home firms in
other industries and the R&D expenditure of foreign firms in their own
sector.  Thus, in the general case there are both international intra-
industry R&D spillovers and local inter-industry spillovers.  The
marginal costs of a typical home firm can thus be written as:
A typical foreign firm faces marginal production costs:
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where we ignore the possibility of inter-industry spillovers between
foreign firms4.  Local inter-industry spillovers are captured by:
and international intra-industry spillovers are represented by:
In practice, we only consider the cases where spillovers are either
intra- or inter-industry.  Finally, in period 1 the home and foreign firms
must incur R&D costs of G(xi) and G*i (x*i ) respectively.
The typical home firm chooses its levels of R&D and output to
maximise profits:
where Ri=pi qi is total revenue, si is the per unit export subsidy and s i
is the per unit R&D subsidy.  The first-order condition for R&D
depends on assumptions about move order and inter-firm cooperation,
to be considered below.  However, in all the equilibria considered the
firms choose their outputs simultaneously given the export subsidy and
R&D levels.  The home first-order condition for output is therefore:
This first-order condition defines the home firm’s reaction function
conditional on the export subsidy and the R&D levels.  The typical
foreign firm faces a similar problem.  Its profits equal R*i!c*i q*i !G*i (x*i )
and its first-order condition for output is:
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which depends only on R&D levels since it does not receive subsidies.
Next, consider government behaviour.  We assume that only the
home government is policy active and it maximises welfare which
equals the sum of profits net of subsidy payments in the two sectors:
Totally differentiating (9) and using the first-order condition (7) to
simplify yields an expression for welfare change which will prove
useful later:
This shows the proximate determinants of welfare in the model.  A rise
in home exports raises the deadweight loss of subsidies and so lowers
welfare; a rise in foreign exports lowers home profits (R iq*<0) and so
lowers welfare; finally, welfare rises with any fall in unit production
costs but falls with extra R&D as additional direct costs are incurred.
The primary focus of the paper is on the implications for optimal
industrial policy of strategic behaviour by firms.  To investigate this, we
contrast two equilibria, which differ in their assumptions about the
ability of firms to commit.  First, the case in which firms can commit in
period 1 to future outputs will be referred to as a Full Commitment
Equilibrium (FCE).  Second, the case in which firms cannot commit
to future output will be called a Government-Only Commitment
Equilibrium (GCE).  In FCE, firms simultaneously choose their R&D
and output levels at the start of period 1 and cannot use R&D
strategically to affect rival output.  By contrast, in GCE firms choose
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their R&D before output and therefore have a strategic incentive to
vary their R&D in order to manipulate the output of their rival.  In both
FCE and GCE we assume that the government can choose both its
R&D subsidy and its export subsidy before firms choose their actions.5
A second issue with which the paper is concerned is the effect of
inter-industry R&D cooperation on optimal policy.  To examine this
we compare the case in which home firms cooperate on their R&D
levels with the case in which they choose their R&D non-
cooperatively.6  With local spillovers there are therefore four different
combinations of assumptions (FCE or GCE, with or without R&D
cooperation) and in each case we assume that the equilibrium is
subgame perfect.
3. LOCAL INTER-INDUSTRY SPILLOVERS 
3.1 The Non-strategic and Non-cooperative Benchmark
In this section we consider the case in which there are positive
spillovers between domestic firms but no international spillovers.  We
will first consider the benchmark case in which firms do not cooperate
on their R&D levels and do not choose their R&D strategically.  This
is the non-cooperative FCE case in which the government chooses its
subsidies in stage 1 and the firms choose R&D levels and output levels
simultaneously in stage 2.  The typical home firm’s first-order
condition for R&D is thus:
and each foreign firm’s first-order condition for R&D is:
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In the first stage of the game the government sets its two policy 
variables, the export subsidy and the R&D subsidy, in each of the two
markets.  In effect the government uses these four policy instruments to
choose the home firms’ R&D and output levels before the foreign firms
choose their actions.  The foreign R&D and outputs then respond to
the home actions according to generalised reaction functions which are
derived by combining the two foreign first-order conditions (8) and
(12).  These generalised reaction functions can be written as:
where the superscript FL denotes FCE with local spillovers.  As shown
in the Appendix these are independent of home R&D in either
industry. 
Proceed by using the home firms’ first-order condition for R&D,
(11), and the total derivatives of (13) in (10) to obtain:7
The optimal export subsidies are obtained from (14) by setting the
coefficients of dqi equal to zero for each i.  The optimal export subsidy
to industry i is:
9s FLi ' ßj?j qj . (16)
where R iq* = !biqi<0.  The right-hand side of (15) captures the standard
Brander-Spencer (1985) rent-shifting effect.  This export subsidy must
be positive when foreign output is a strategic substitute for home
output.8  In that case the subsidy, by committing the home firm to
larger output, reduces the output of the foreign firm in that industry
which in turn raises home profits and welfare.  Unlike in the standard
Brander and Spencer (1985) case, the export subsidy is being used not
just to reduce foreign output directly, but also to reduce foreign R&D
which has an additional indirect effect tending to reduce foreign
output.  The derivative dQFiL/dqi captures both the direct effect of home
output and the indirect effect that works through changes in foreign
R&D.
The optimal R&D subsidies are obtained from (14) by setting the
coefficients of dxi equal to zero for each i.  These are:
These subsidies are positive since they correct for the positive R&D
externalities within the economy.  This confirms the presumption that
R&D spillovers justify a subsidy.
There is a clear division of labour between the export subsidy and
the R&D subsidy in this case.  The export subsidy plays a purely rent-
shifting role while the R&D subsidy is targeted towards ensuring that
R&D is chosen at the socially cost-minimising level; i.e. the level at
which the marginal social benefit of R&D, ?iqi+ßj?jqj, equals its
marginal cost GNi.  This may be confirmed by substituting from (16) into
(11).
3.2 The Effect of Strategic Behaviour without R&D Cooperation
We will now begin our analysis of the effect of strategic behaviour on
optimal policy.  We first consider this government-only commitment
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equilibrium in the absence of R&D cooperation.  In the GCE case firms
play strategically, taking account of the effect of their R&D on the
output of the rival firm.  The appropriate first-order conditions for
home and foreign output are, as in all cases, given by (7) and (8) above.
The first-order condition for R&D for a typical home firm is:
where:
Here ai=qi /(qi+q*i ) is the market share of the home firm in industry i
and a*i =1!ai is that of the foreign firm in industry i.  Ei is positive when
foreign output is a strategic substitute for home output.9  This simplifies
to:
Assuming outputs are strategic substitutes, the home firms strategically
overinvest in R&D in the manner of Spence (1977), Dixit (1980) and
Brander and Spencer (1983).  The same is true of the foreign firms,
whose first-order condition can similarly be written as:
In stage 1 the government sets its policy variables anticipating
that foreign R&D and output will respond according to generalised
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reaction functions.  In the GCE case these reaction functions are
derived by combining the foreign firms’ first-order conditions, (8) and
(19), and can be written as:
where the superscript G refers to GCE.  As in the FCE case these
reaction functions are independent of home R&D.  Proceed by
substituting the home firm’s first-order condition for R&D, (11), and
the derivatives of (20) in the expression for welfare change, (10).  The
resulting optimal export subsidies have the same form as those
represented in (15) for the FCE case.  In the GCE case the optimal
export subsidy to sector i can be written as:
As in the FCE case the export subsidy is used to shift rent from
foreigners to the home country.  As shown in the Appendix, strategic
substitutability still works towards a positive optimal subsidy though
it is no longer sufficient to ensure it. 
The optimal R&D subsidy is:
The first term on the right hand side of (22) can be interpreted in the
same manner as the corresponding term in (16).  The government
encourages investment in R&D because there is a positive externality.
The second term corrects for strategic overinvestment in R&D by the
home firm.  As in FCE the R&D subsidy ensures that home R&D is at
the socially cost minimising level.  This can be seen by using (22) to
eliminate the R&D subsidy in (18).
12
Export subsidies and R&D subsidies under GCE cannot be
directly compared with those under FCE as they are evaluated at
different levels of output and R&D.  However, the additional term in
the GCE R&D subsidy makes it presumptively smaller than its
counterpart under FCE when foreign output is a strategic substitute for
home output.  The optimal policy towards R&D may even be a tax if
the strategic effect outweighs the externality effect.  In the special case
of no externalities (ßj=0) considered by Spencer and Brander (1983),
R&D should definitely be taxed.  
13
? ' j
2
i
R i & (ci & si)qi & Gi % s ixi . (23)
M?
Mxi
' ?i qi % ßj?jqj & G
)
i % s i ' 0, (24)
3.3   The Effect of R&D Cooperation without Strategic Behaviour
We will begin our analysis of the effect of R&D cooperation on the
optimal industrial policy by considering the benchmark FCE case in
which the firms do not choose R&D strategically.  Given R&D levels
the industries are unlinked, so cooperation between home firms at the
output stage is not an issue.  At the output stage firms behave as before
and their first-order conditions are given in (7) and (8) above.  Since
there are no inter-industry spillovers among foreign firms, they have
nothing to gain by cooperating with each other and foreign R&D first-
order conditions are the same as those in (12) above.  Hence only the
R&D behaviour of home firms is affected by cooperation.  We will
assume that levels of home R&D are chosen to maximise the home
firms’ joint profits but the decision to cooperate does not itself affect
the levels of spillovers.  The ß’s only depend on R&D levels and are
independent of the decision to cooperate10.  In the case of cooperative
FCE each home firm takes output levels as given and chooses its R&D
to maximise the following joint profit function:
This implies the first-order condition:
Compared to (11) this has an additional term in the spillover parameter
ßj.  The cooperative internalises the national R&D externality and sets
the marginal social benefit of R&D equal to its marginal cost inclusive
of subsidies.  As in the non-cooperative case, the home government
effectively chooses the two R&D levels and the two output levels to
maximise welfare with foreign R&D and output reacting according to
(13).  Since the behaviour of the foreign firms is unchanged by the
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decision of the home firms to cooperate, the foreign generalised
reaction functions are also unchanged.  The optimal subsidies are
obtained by substituting (24) and the total derivatives of (13) in the
expression for welfare change, (10).  The optimal export subsidy is
identical both in form and magnitude to that under non-cooperative
FCE and given in equation (15).11  The optimal R&D subsidy is: 
The superscript C indicates R&D cooperation.  Compared to the R&D
subsidy under non-cooperative FCE, the term in ßj disappears because
the firms now internalise the externality so there is no need for
government intervention.
Proposition 1: The optimal R&D subsidy is zero under FCE with
cooperation on R&D, and hence is lower than the optimal R&D
subsidy under FCE with no cooperation on R&D for any positive
spillover parameter ßj.
Another way of expressing this result is that the Coase Theorem applies
in this case: R&D cooperation is a perfect substitute for industrial
policy.
3.4 The Effect of Strategic Behaviour with R&D Cooperation
We now consider how strategic behaviour interacts with R&D
cooperation and how this affects optimal policy.  In the GCE case the
home cooperative takes account of how its R&D affects the output of
the foreign firm.  The first-order condition for home R&D is:
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As before Ej is positive if outputs are strategic substitutes in industry j.
This first-order condition can be rewritten as:
In stage 1 the government chooses its subsidies and the foreign
firms react according to the GCE reaction functions in (20).  The
resulting optimal export subsidies are identical to those under non-
cooperative GCE and are given in (21).  The optimal R&D subsidy is:
While in the non-cooperation case higher spillovers contribute to a
higher R&D subsidy, in this case they work in the opposite direction.
To find the effect on optimal policy of R&D cooperation when firms
are playing strategically we can subtract the cooperative R&D subsidy
from the non-cooperative R&D subsidy to get:
Unlike in the non-strategic FCE case, R&D cooperation under GCE
does not render industrial intervention redundant.
Proposition 2: For any positive spillover parameter ßj the optimal
R&D subsidy to the ith firm is larger under GCE with no
cooperation on R&D than under GCE with cooperation on R&D.
The Coase Theorem does not apply in this case because the cooperative
‘over-internalises’ the externality.  It overinvests in R&D in industry i
to obtain a strategic advantage over the foreign firms in both industries
and a subsidy is required to restrain it from this socially wasteful
16
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activity.
4. INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS
4.1 The Non-strategic Benchmark
In this section we turn to examine the case in which there are
international spillovers between firms.  To keep the analysis from
becoming excessively complicated we will assume no inter-industry
spillovers between firms: ß=0.  In all cases the firms’ first-order
conditions for output are given in (7) and (8) above, and under FCE the
firms’ first-order conditions for R&D are given in (11) and (12).  The
only difference is that now the marginal costs and the ?’s depend on
the R&D levels of foreign rivals as well as those of the firms
themselves.  This is due to the presence of international R&D
spillovers.  As demonstrated in the Appendix, this difference implies
that the foreign generalised reaction functions for R&D and output
depend not just on home output as in the case without international
spillovers, but on the levels of home R&D.  Intuitively this is because
home R&D now directly affects the foreign first-order condition
through the spillover effects.  The resulting reaction functions under
FCE with international spillovers can be written as:
where the superscript I indicates international spillovers.  We can drop
industry subscripts in this section because there are no links between
industries in the absence of local spillovers and hence each industry
can be treated separately.
Proceed by using the home firms’ first-order condition for R&D,
(11), and the total derivatives of (30) in the expression for welfare
change, (10), to obtain:
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The optimal export subsidy is obtained from (31) by setting the
coefficient of dq equal to zero:
The first term on the right-hand side is the usual rent-shifting effect and
it is shown in the Appendix that this must be positive if foreign output
is a strategic substitute for home output.  We also show in the
Appendix that if foreign output is a strategic substitute for home output
then the second term on the right-hand side is negative.  In that case the
subsidy, by raising home output, reduces foreign R&D and thus the
beneficial spillover enjoyed by the home firm.  Hence with strategic
substitutes this effect works against a positive optimal export subsidy.
The optimal R&D subsidy is also obtained from (31) by setting
the coefficient of dx equal to zero:
Unlike in the purely local spillover case, there is now a rent-shifting
role for the R&D subsidy.  The government can reduce foreign output,
thus shifting rent to the home country by taxing R&D and thus
reducing the beneficial spillovers to foreigners.  The first term on the
right hand side captures this rent-shifting effect of R&D.  This term is
negative because q* is directly increasing in x.
The second term on the right-hand side captures the welfare
effect of more home R&D via its effect on the level of foreign R&D.
As shown in the Appendix, an increase in home R&D leads to more
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foreign R&D and thus increases beneficial spillovers to home firms.
Hence this term, which we can call a spillback effect, works towards
a positive R&D subsidy.
Proposition 3: The optimal R&D subsidy under FCE with
international spillovers is negative if, and only if, the negative
rent-shifting effect outweighs the positive spillback effect.
Note the apparent paradox: even without strategic behaviour, the fact
that R&D spillovers benefit the foreign firm provides a motive for
subsidisation.
4.2 The Effect of Strategic Behaviour
We consider next the GCE case with international spillovers in which
the firms choose their R&D strategically.  The first-order condition for
home R&D is:  
where:
The home firm strategically overinvests in R&D when the spillover to
the foreign firm is below the threshold level e&*.  As in d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), the threshold equals 0.5 when demands are
linear (r=0) and R&D is equally efficient in both firms (?=?*).  The
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foreign first-order condition can similarly be written as:
where:
In stage 1 the government sets both the R&D subsidy and export
subsidy anticipating that the foreign firm responds according to the
generalised reaction functions which are derived by combining (8) and
(36).  These generalised reaction functions can be written as:
The optimal export subsidy has the same form as (32) in the FCE case:
These terms have the same interpretation as in the FCE case but, as is
shown in the Appendix, it is somewhat more difficult to sign them.
Finally, the optimal R&D subsidy is:
The first two terms on the right hand side of (40) can be interpreted in
the same manner as the corresponding terms in (33).  The final term
corrects for strategic overinvestment or underinvestment in R&D by the
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home firm: it is negative for low spillovers but positive for high
spillovers (e¯*>e*).
Proposition 4: In GCE with international spillovers the optimal R&D
subsidy has the same form as in FCE, except for an extra term
which offsets the strategic behaviour of the home firm.
Since the sign of the optimal R&D subsidy in this case is inherently
ambiguous, it is desirable to examine its magnitude under special
functional forms and we turn to this in the next section.
5. THE LINEAR CASE
We can illustrate more forcefully some of the general results of
previous sections if we specialise to specific functional forms.  In this
section we adopt a simple linear specification of demand and assume
that R&D affects marginal costs in a linear fashion and is itself subject
to quadratic costs.  The linear inverse demand function is given by:
where ai and bi are constants.  Marginal costs for the home and foreign
firm are given by:
where the c&’s, ?’s, ß’s and e’s are all constant.  It will also prove useful
to define the parameters: ?i=?i2/bi?i and ?*i =?*i 2/bi?*i .  These represent
the relative return to R&D for a typical home and foreign firm
respectively.
In all cases, the optimal export subsidies are positive: the
ambiguities noted in some cases under general demands vanish.  We
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therefore concentrate on the R&D subsidies, which are shown in Table
1.  In the absence of strategic behaviour (i.e., in FCE), the signs of the
optimal R&D subsidies accord with simple intuition.  R&D should be
subsidised when spillovers are local, though not when firms cooperate
on R&D (when no intervention is warranted); and it should be taxed
when spillovers are international.  (The latter result shows that the
ambiguity found in (33) for the general case is resolved: the rent-
shifting effect dominates the spillback effect.)  
However, when firms behave strategically the results are much
less clearcut.  With local spillovers, the GCE results confirm equations
(22) and (28).  In particular, the optimal subsidy without R&D
cooperation is increasing in the spillover parameter ßj whereas with
cooperation it is decreasing in ßj.  This shows clearly that the
cooperative over-internalises the externality when it plays strategically.
Finally, the case of international spillovers (corresponding to equation
(40)) is the most complex of all and this subsidy may even be positive.
Figure 1 shows the results of simulating the optimal GCE subsidy
with international spillovers when firms are symmetric (so ?=?*, e=e*
and ?=?*).  As can be seen from the diagram the R&D subsidy is
falling in ?, the relative effectiveness of R&D, at e=0.  With zero
spillovers the government’s only motive for intervention is to correct
for strategic overproduction on the part of the home firm.  As e
becomes positive the other two motives for intervention, the rent-
shifting effect which works towards a tax and the spillback effect which
works towards a subsidy, come into play.  In addition as e gets larger
the need to correct for the home firm’s strategic overproduction is
reduced.  For most values of ? and e the per-unit R&D subsidy is
increasing in the spillover parameter and at high values of both ? and
e it turns positive.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have explored the implications for trade and industrial
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policy in open economies of R&D spillovers between oligopolistic
firms.  Specifically, we have investigated a strategic trade model which
allows for local R&D spillovers between firms in different industries
and international R&D spillovers between firms in different countries.
Our analysis has identified three distinct motives for R&D policy,
whose qualitative implications are summarised in Table 2.  First, there
is the standard Pigovian motive: R&D should be encouraged because
it yields externalities which cannot be captured by home firms acting
alone.  This naturally mandates a subsidy when the spillovers are local.
More surprisingly, and contrary to the suggestion of Spencer (1986),
it also justifies a subsidy when the spillovers are international.  This is
because of what we call the ‘spillback’ effect which arises from the
reciprocal nature of the R&D spillovers.  The home firm benefits from
the additional R&D undertaken by the foreign firm as a result of an
increase in its own R&D.
The second motive for R&D policy is to shift rents or, more
accurately, to exercise the government’s superior commitment power
in order to move the home firm to the position it would adopt on its
own if it were a Stackelberg leader.  In the presence of international
spillovers, changes in home R&D affect foreign output directly and
thus affect the level of home profits.  This mandates an R&D tax to
reduce foreign output and so shift rents to the home country.
Finally, when firms behave strategically there is a third motive for
intervention.  Such strategic behaviour involves over- or under-
investment in R&D which is socially wasteful, and so intervention to
offset it is justified.  This motive for intervention has highly counter-
intuitive implications.  In the absence of intra-industry spillovers (and
irrespective of whether or not there are local inter-industry spillovers),
a home firm tends to overinvest strategically in R&D and so an R&D
tax is justified.  However, the greater the degree of intra-industry
spillovers, the more the home firm tends to underinvest in R&D (since
it anticipates that some of the benefits will accrue to its foreign rival).
Hence the more an R&D subsidy is justified, even though the spillovers
accrue to a foreign firm whose profits are of no concern to the home
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government.
The other issue considered in the paper is whether R&D
cooperation by firms can internalise inter-industry R&D spillovers, thus
rendering industrial policy redundant.  We have shown that this does
indeed happen when strategic behaviour is absent.  However, when
firms cooperate and behave strategically they will typically over-
internalise the externality and engage in too much R&D, thus
mandating an offsetting R&D tax.
Our model has naturally simplified in many respects.  We have
assumed that there is only one firm in each domestic industry.
Relaxing this would provide a strategic motive for R&D subsidies; but
it would also dilute the rent-shifting motive for subsidising exports and
the net effect is uncertain.  We have considered only the first-best case,
where the R&D subsidy is supplemented by an optimal export subsidy.
In the alternative case where an export subsidy is not available, there
is an additional second-best motive for subsidising R&D, as in Spencer
and Brander (1983).  Finally, we have concentrated on the Cournot
case of output competition in the second stage.  As is well known,
many of the conclusions are likely to be reversed if instead firms
compete on price in a Bertrand manner.
It would be desirable in future work to relax these assumptions.
However, doing so is unlikely to overturn our basic point, which has
been obscured by the concentration on studying R&D spillovers in
models of monopolistic competition.  When strategic behaviour is taken
into account, the case for subsidising local R&D spillovers and taxing
international spillovers is much less clearcut.
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1. International R&D spillovers between firms in the same industry have
been examined in Cheng (1987), Motta (1994) and Neary and
O’Sullivan (1997).  Inter-industry spillovers have recently been
examined in a closed economy by Katsoulacos and Ulph (1995).
2. The distinction between local and international spillovers is studied in
a different context by Rivera-Batiz and Oliva (1996).
3. Extension to n industries is straightforward and adds nothing important
to the analysis.
4. It is possible that the foreign firms have different nationalities.
5. For models in which governments cannot commit to their future
second-period intervention, see Leahy and Neary (1996, 1997a and
1997b) and Neary and Leahy (1996).
6. International cooperation with spillovers is discussed in Neary and
O’Sullivan (1997).
7. The derivatives of (13) are examined in the Appendix.
8. The relationship between strategic substitutability and the sign of
dQFi L/dqi is discussed in the Appendix.  Foreign output is a strategic
substitute for home output if the marginal profitability of foreign output
falls in home output; i.e. if R*q iq* is negative.  This may be considered the
‘norma’ case under Cournot competition.
9. To see this note that the numerator 1+a*i ri equals !R*q i*q/bi; and as
shown in the Appendix the denominator 3+ri must be positive to
ensure stability.
10. For an alternative account in which the decision to cooperate itself
affects spillovers at given R&D levels see Katz (1986), Kamien et al
(1992), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1994) and Motta (1994). 
11. The optimal subsidies can be directly compared because the real
equilibria with optimal policy are the same whether firms cooperate or
not.
ENDNOTES
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APPENDIX
1. Strategic Effects in GCE
To calculate the strategic effects in GCE, we totally differentiate the
home and foreign firms’ first-order conditions for output (7) and (8) to
get:
These can be solved for dqi and dq*i  to get:
where:
We assume Di is positive to ensure stability of the output game.  In the
text we make frequent use of the following:
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R iqq and R*q i*q* are negative from the firms’ second-order conditions and
the other two terms are negative provided home and foreign output are
strategic substitutes. 
2. Generalised Reaction Functions When Spillovers Are Local
2.1 FCE 
To calculate the slopes of the generalised reaction functions under
FCE, totally differentiate the two first-order conditions for a typical
foreign firm (8) and (12).  The total derivative of (8), the first-order
condition for output, is given in (44) above and the total derivative of
(12), the first-order condition for R&D, is:
where p*x i*x*=?*i Nq*i !G*i O < 0 and p*x i*q*=?*i >0.  Solving equations (44)
and (49) for dxi* and dqi* and setting e*=0 yields:
where:
Note that p*x i*x* and R*q i*q* are negative and ? i is positive from the typical
foreign firm’s second-order conditions.  As mentioned in the text R*q i*q
is negative if foreign output is a strategic substitute for home output.
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From (50) and (51) we can now see that:  (i) x*i  and q*i  depend only on
qi; and (ii) the sign of the derivatives of the generalised reaction
functions depend only on the sign of R*q i*q.
2.2 GCE
To determine the slopes of the generalised reaction functions under
GCE we first need the total derivative of (19), the typical foreign firm’s
first-order condition for R&D under GCE:
Compared to (49) there is now an additional term in dqi.  Let
E*i=(1+airi)/(3+ri).  Then under GCE: p*x i*x*=?*i N(1+E*i)q*i !G*i O,
p*x i*q*=?*i (1+E*i)+?*i q*E*q i and p*x i*q=?*i q*E*q i.  Stability considerations
mean that we continue to assume that p*x i*x* is negative and that ? i is
positive.  However, p*x i*q* and p*x i*q cannot be unambiguously signed.
Nevertheless, p*x i*q* will be positive provided the term in E*q i* is not too
negative. 
To obtain expressions for dx*i  and dq*i , set e*=0 and combine
(44) with (53) to get:
From these equations we can see that x*i  and q*i  depend only on qi and
that strategic substitutes contribute to x*i  and q*i  falling in qi.
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3. Generalised Reaction Functions: International Spillovers 
3.1 FCE
To compute the slopes of the generalised reaction functions in this case
totally differentiate (12) to get:
(Note we have dropped the industry superscripts and subscripts as there
are no inter-industry spillovers).  Compared to (49), the presence of
international spillovers implies that there is an additional term in dx.
This is because in the international spillover case ?* depends not just
on x* but also on x via the spillover effect. 
The derivatives of the foreign marginal profit functions can be
written more explicitly as: p*x *x*=?*x *q*!G*O<0, p*x *q*=?*>0 and
p*x *x=?*x q* which cannot be signed.  To obtain expressions for dx* and
dq* combine (44) with (56) to get:
From these we can see that:  (i) x* and q* depend on q and x; (ii) the
sign of the derivatives with respect to q of the generalised reaction
functions depend only on the sign of R*q *q; and (iii) the derivatives with
respect to x will be positive provided p*x *x is not too negative.  (This
includes the linear case when p*x *x is zero.) 
3.2 GCE
To obtain slopes of the generalised reaction function totally
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differentiate (36) to get:
Compared to (56) there is an additional term in dq.  This arises because
the term in brackets in (36) depends on q.
The derivatives in (59) are somewhat harder to sign than in the
FCE case.  It will help in determining the signs of these derivatives to
define: T(x,x*,q,q*)=1+A*( e&-e)>0.  (T is greater or less than unity as e&
is greater or less than e.)  Then: p*x *x*=T?*x *q*+?*q*Tx*!G*O < 0,
p*x *q*=?*(T+q*Tq*), p*x *x=T?*x q*+?*q*Tx and p*x *q=?*q*Tq.  To obtain
expressions for dx* and dq*, combine (44) and (59) to get:
As in the FCE case, strategic substitutes contribute to foreign R&D and
foreign output falling in q.  However, as in the GCE case with local
spillovers, they are not sufficient now due to the term in p*x *q.  The
derivatives with respect to home R&D take the same form as those
under FCE and can be interpreted in the same way.
